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JUSTICE IN SYRIA: INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL
LIABILITY FOR HIGHEST OFFICIALS
IN THE ASSAD REGIME
Seema Kassab
Seven years have passed since revolution broke out in Syria in
March of 2011. During those six years, hundreds of thousands of
Syrians lost their lives,1 millions of Syrians were internally dis-
placed or left the country seeking refuge,2 and a beautiful and di-
verse country was hijacked and terrorized by civil war. Every day
in Syria, people are detained, tortured, raped, and killed. Attacks
on homes, hospitals, markets, and schools are common occur-
rences. At this stage of the conflict, there is little doubt that it is the
most horrific and dire humanitarian crisis since World War II.3 The
conflict began as an uprising in protest of the authoritarian Assad
regime, which has ruled Syria for over four decades.4 Unfortu-
nately, it has escalated into a brutal civil war between the Assad
regime, several rebel factions, and an Islamic extremist infiltration.
Bloodshed and terror are now Syria’s everyday reality. When and
how will those responsible be held accountable for these atrocities?
WHAT INTERNATIONAL CRIMES ARE BEING COMMITTED IN SYRIA?
Targeting Civilians and Indiscriminate Attacks
The targeting and killing of civilians is a crime against humanity under
article 7(1)(a) and a war crime under articles 8(2)(a)(i), 8(2)(c)(i), and
8(2)(e)(i) of the Rome Statute.5 Syrian and Russian airstrikes have been
indiscriminately directed at civilian areas, including homes, schools, mar-
kets, and hospitals.6 The government has used barrel bombs, cluster muni-
1. The Syrian Center for Policy Research recorded 470,000 deaths as of February
2016. Syria Events of 2016, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2017), https://www.hrw.org/world-re-
port/2017/country-chapters/syria.
2. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs recorded 6.1 million
internally displaced people and 4.8 million people seeking refuge abroad. Id.
3. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein described the
conflict as “the worst man-made disaster the world has seen since World War II.” Syria ‘worst
man-made disaster since World War II’ – UN rights chief, UN NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 14, 2017),
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=56349#.WaRYF1GGN3g.
4. Neil Quilliam, Hands of Power: The Rise of Syria’s Assad Family, CHATHAM
HOUSE (Nov. 4, 2015), https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/hands-power-rise-
syrias-assad-family.
5. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome, 17 July 1998), art 7-8,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 of 17 July 1998 [hereinafter The Rome Statute].
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
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tions, and flammable incendiary weapons in attacking civilian areas.7 On
April 27, 2016, the Syrian-Russian Coalition launched an airstrike on al-
Quds Hospital  killing 58 civilians and patients. In August alone, govern-
ment forces bombarded health facilities in Idlib, Aleppo, Hama, and
Homs.8
Rape
Sexual violence and rape, which have been rampant throughout the
Syrian Conflict,9 are war crimes under article 8(2)(e)(vi) and crimes
against humanity under article 7(1)(g) of the Rome Statute.10 In 2013,
only two years into the war, the UN treated 38,000 victims of sexual vio-
lence in Syria, along with large numbers of other victims who fled to Jor-
dan and Lebanon.11 The UN Independent International Commission of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic (COI) was established in August
2011 by the Human Rights Council with a mandate of investigating alleged
violations of international human rights law in Syria since March 2011.12
The COI verified that Syrian government forces and government-con-
trolled militia (Shabbiha) have used sexual violence as a war weapon.13
Sexual violence occurs during raids, at checkpoints, in detention centers
and prisons.14 The threat of rape is also used as a tool to coerce confes-
sions.15  Furthermore, human rights groups have documented numerous
reports of rape by regime  forces against women and girls believed to be
associated with the opposition. According to a report by the Syrian Ac-
countability Project, a student-run and internationally recognized organi-
zation based at Syracuse University College of Law, rape and sexual
assault have been rampant in Syria since the start of the conflict.16 Their
findings report that 62% of incidents of rape and sexual violence were
committed by the regime between 2011 and 2012 and 23% were commit-
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, ¶ 95,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/24/46 (2013).
10. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7-8
11. 26th Session of the UPR Working Group of the HRC, Submission: Human Rights
Violations Against Women and Girls in Syria at ¶ 6 (March 24, 2016).
12. Indep. Int’l Commision of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, UNITED NATIONS
HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/
HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx.
13. UPR Working Group, supra note 11, ¶ 6.
14. Rep. of the Indep. Int’l  Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, supra
note 9, ¶ 95-100.
15. Id.
16. Peter Levrant, Looking through the Window Darkly, A Snapshot Analysis of Rape
in Syria, SYRIAN ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT, 4 (2015) http://syrianaccountabilityproject.syr
.edu/wp-content/uploads/looking-through-the-window-darkly-a-snapshot-analysis-of-rape-in-
syria-by-syrian-accountability-project.pdf.
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ted by Shabbiha, while only 2% were committed by the Free Syrian
Army.17
Restricting Humanitarian Assistance
The Assad government has purposefully engaged in blocking humani-
tarian assistance from reaching besieged areas in Syria.18 Intentionally di-
recting attacks or obstructing the delivery of humanitarian assistance is
considered a war crime under article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute.19
Government forces have prohibited medical treatment items, such as
emergency health kits and antibiotics, from reaching civilians in need.20
Additionally, from 2012 until June 2016, the Assad regime blocked UN-
facilitated food and medicine meant to reach four thousand civilians from
entering Darayaa.21 The government has also imposed unnecessary bu-
reaucratic obstacles on aid agencies, refusing to grant visas to international
aid workers and requiring that they obtain permits before entering be-
sieged areas. The COI also discovered that the government detained many
Red Crescent volunteers and medical staff on grounds of “having sup-
ported terrorists.” Additionally, the government continues to bombard
healthcare facilities in opposition-held areas, including in Hama and
Aleppo.22
Arbitrary Arrests, Enforced Disappearances, Torture, and Ill-Treatment
Arbitrary arrests, detention, torture, and forced disappearances have
been widespread and systematic in the Syrian Conflict. Arbitrary arrests,
detention and kidnap are listed as crimes against humanity under article
7(1)(e).23 The COI has reported that “since March 2011, a countrywide
pattern emerged in which civilians, mainly males above the age of 15, were
arbitrarily arrested and detained by the Syrian security and armed forces
or by militia acting on behalf of the government during mass arrests, house
searches, at checkpoints, and in hospitals.”24 Arrests have targeted civil-
ians perceived to be associated with the opposition or lacking sufficient
government loyalty.25
Torture and ill-treatment are also crimes against humanity under arti-
cle 7(1)(f) and war crimes under articles 8(2)(a)(ii) and (iii), as well as
17. Id.
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
19. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 8.
20. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH supra note 1.
21. U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, H.R., and Lab., Syria 2016 Human
Rights Report 26 (2016), https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265732.pdf.
22. Id.
23. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7.
24. U.N. Human Rights Council, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Deaths in Detention in
the Syrian Arab Republic, 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/CRP.1, (Feb. 3, 2016).
25. Id.
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article 8(2)(c)(ii) of the Rome Statute.26 Between March 2011 and June
2016, at least 12,679 people died in custody, from causes including starva-
tion, torture, abuse, beatings and disease.27 Human Rights Watch and the
COI reported incidents of torture taking place in government detention
facilities, including the Mezzeh airport detention facility, Military Security
Branches 215, 227, 235, 248, and 291, Adra and Sednaya prisons, the
Harasta Air Force Intelligence Branch, Harasta Military Hospital, Mezzeh
Military Hospital 601, and Tishreen Military Hospital.28 The COI also re-
ported that the Counterterrorism Court (CTC) and field military courts
use torture to obtain forced confessions.29 Additionally, the COI reported
that, “beginning in 2011 and continuing through the year, security forces
subjected detainees to ill-treatment in military hospitals, purposely imped-
ing medical care or exacerbating existing injuries as a method of abuse and
interrogation.”30 Furthermore, enforced disappearances are considered
crimes against humanity under article 7(1)(i) of the Rome Statute.31 In
August 2016, the Syrian Network for Human Rights found that 96 percent
of the estimated 75,000 forced disappearances were perpetrated by the
government.32
These war crimes and crimes against humanity are merely a sample of
the types of human rights violations that the Assad government has perpe-
trated on Syrian civilians over the past seven years. The quantity of crimes
committed is uncountable and the severity indescribable. Additionally,
there are provisions of the Rome Statute, other than the ones described as
being violated above, that could be used to prosecute government officials.
Although the substance of the Assad regime’s crimes can be delved into
much more deeply, the focus of this paper is on accountability for these
crimes. The rest of this paper seeks to evaluate the strength of the evi-
dence that exists against the Assad regime and how Assad, as well as other
regime officials, can be held individually liable for war crimes and crimes
against humanity under Articles 25 and 28 of the Rome Statute.
WHAT EVIDENCE EXISTS IMPLICATING THE ASSAD REGIME?
There is no shortage of war crimes and crimes against humanity being
committed in Syria by the multiple parties fighting for power on the
ground. However, according to investigators, the Assad regime is commit-
ting many of them,33 demonstrating that it is willing to defy international
law and dispose of all sense of humanity in order to crush the rebellion.
26. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7-8.
27. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 1.
28. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 20, at 6.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 8.
31. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 7.
32. U.S. Dep’t of State, supra note 20, at 8.
33. See Ben Taub, The Assad Files, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www
.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/04/18/bashar-al-assads-war-crimes-exposed.
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These widespread war crimes and crimes against humanity in Syria have
been documented by the UN and various human rights organizations
throughout the conflict.34 Not only has the evidence been documented,
but it has been gathered with future prosecution efforts in mind. Over the
past four years, the Commission for International Justice and Accountabil-
ity (CIJA), an independent investigative body founded in 2012 in response
to the Syrian war, has smuggled more than 600,000 government documents
out of Syria; these documents link the Assad regime to war crimes and
crimes against humanity.35 CIJA’s work has recently produced a four-hun-
dred-page legal brief, known as the Assad Files, which links the Assad gov-
ernment to the systematic torture and murder of hundreds of thousands of
Syrians.36 The smuggled documents can be attributed to various levels
within the government, ranging from local intelligence branches to the
highest level of Assad’s security committee, the Central Crisis Manage-
ment Cell (Crisis Cell).”37
The Crisis Cell was created after the uprising in order to quash the
opposition, and is composed of Assad’s most trusted confidants: members
of the Baath party and his family.38 The members met every night and
determined strategies to approach every security issue the Assad govern-
ment was facing.39 Just five months into the uprisings, the Crisis Cell held
its usual meeting and devised a plan to target specific categories of people.
They decided that first, all security branches were “to launch daily raids
against protest organizers” and “those who tarnish the image of Syria in
foreign media.”40 Next they decided that “security agents would coordi-
nate with Baathist loyalists, neighborhood militias, and community lead-
ers” to keep the area free of opposition activists.41 Third, they would
“establish a joint investigation committee at the province level,” com-
prised of representatives from all of the security branches to interrogate
detainees.42 The results of the interrogations were to “be sent to all secur-
ity branches to be used in determining where to focus prosecution
efforts.”43
34. See, e.g. Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 (2012); Oral Update of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the
Syrian Arab Republic, Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 20th
Sess., paras. 62-87, U.N. Doc. A/HR/20/CRP.1 (2012); Rep. of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of
Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/69 (2012).
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Wa’el Alzayat et al., Prosecuting Assad: War Crimes, Mass Atrocities, and U.S.
Policy, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE, (Aug. 5, 2016), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/pol-
icy-analysis/view/prosecuting-assad-war-crimes-mass-atrocities-and-u.s.-policy.
38. See Taub, supra note 33.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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All policies created during the Crisis Cell’s meetings were converted
into orders and passed down to operatives through the respective intelli-
gence agencies. The documents show that detailed information was passed
both up and down the chains of command.44 For example, every piece of
anti-government graffiti reached the Crisis Cell at the very top of the
chain. The intense and structured coordination between the agencies
reveals the degree to which these high-level officials were aware of every-
thing that happened on the ground.45 Not only do the documents discov-
ered by CIJA reveal the specific orders of the regime, but they also expose
the systematic policies behind them. After every meeting, Assad reviewed
the proposed strategies, signed off on them, and returned the orders to the
Crisis Cell for implementation.46 Assad’s required approval of every pol-
icy is direct evidence that he had knowledge of all the crimes being com-
mitted by his forces.
A man named Abdelmajid Barakat was hired to process all the
paperwork that came out of the Crisis Cell. He also became the mole
within the government, leaking documents to the Syrian Opposition, who
then forwarded them to Arabic news agencies.47 These documents, along
with CIJA’s 600,000 pages, revealed multiple parallel chains of command
from the Crisis Cell.48 Not only were documents smuggled out of Syria,
but so were thousands of photographs depicting emaciated, mutilated,
burned, shot, beaten, strangled, broken, and melted bodies. A military
defector known by the alias, Cesar, fled Syria in August 2013 with flash
drives hidden in his shoes containing 53,275 of these photographs.49 At
least 6,786 of the photographed bodies belong to detainees who either
died in detention centers or after being transferred from detention to a
military hospital.50 The photos divulge the pervasiveness of torture, star-
vation, beatings, and illness in the government detention facilities.51
As regime agents began to defect from the government, CIJA investi-
gators found these defectors and took witness statements. They inter-
viewed about 250 victims across several Syrian provinces in order to
secure pattern evidence and demonstrate that the regime perpetrated
these crimes in a systematic manner.52 As a result, CIJA was able to ex-
pose consistent patterns in interrogation practices across all branches of
the security agencies.53
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Taub, supra note 33.
48. See id.
49. See Syria: Stories Behind Photos of Killed Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/16/syria-stories-behind-photos-killed-
detainees.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Taub, supra note 33.
53. Id.
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Investigators suggest that the existing evidence that links the Assad
regime to war crimes and crimes against humanity is more complete and
incriminatory than any body of evidence that has been previously gathered
during an active conflict.54 Stephen Rapp, who led the prosecutions at the
international criminal tribunals in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, claimed that
CIJA’s documentation is “much richer than anything I’ve seen, and any-
thing I’ve prosecuted in this area.”55 Despite the thoroughness of the evi-
dence, the Assad government continues to violate international law and
perpetrate massive human rights abuses as the internal conflict persists
throughout the country. Meanwhile, the international community has re-
mained passive, essentially allowing Assad to continue perpetrating
human rights abuses against civilians without consequence.
HOW CAN THE ASSAD REGIME BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE
FOR THESE WIDESPREAD CRIMES?
Accountability in Syria is possible via three different avenues, how-
ever, not all of them are equally viable. The first avenue, also the least
viable, is through domestic courts in Syria. Although Syrian authorities are
obligated to investigate and prosecute international crimes on Syrian terri-
tory, the likelihood of this option being pursued is very low. The situation
in Syria is still unstable, and the even if the conflict ends, it is likely that
domestic courts will lack the capacity to oversee the prosecution and in-
vestigation of complex international crimes committed on Syrian terri-
tory.56 Additionally, the internal conflict has broken Syria up into several
regions dominated by a variety of parties on the ground. The Assad re-
gime no longer controls the entire country. Due to the uncertainty in what
the composition of governance in Syria will look like post-conflict, the ca-
pacity and ability of the domestic courts to prosecute crime is largely
unknown.
The second venue for achieving justice in Syria is through the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC, governed by the Rome Statute, is
limited in the cases that it can hear and the manner through which cases
are brought before it.57 The ICC hears cases involving four types of
crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of ag-
gression.58 Additionally, it only has jurisdiction over subjects who 1) have
committed a crime in or against a party to the court, or 2) who are nation-
als of a party to the court, or 3) when each of these fails, the UN Security
Council can refer the case to the ICC if the situation is particularly egre-
54. Ben Taub, Does Anyone in Syria Fear International Law, THE NEW YORKER (Aug.
31, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/does-anyone-in-syria-fear-interna-
tional-law.
55. Taub, supra note 33.
56. Annika Jones, Seeking International Criminal Justice in Syria, 89 Int’l L. Stud. 802,
804–805 Ser. US Naval War Col. (2013).
57. See The Rome Statute, supra note 5.
58. Id. at art. 5.
290 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 39:283
gious.59 Since Syria has never ratified the Rome Statute, the ICC has no
independent authority to investigate or prosecute crimes that take place
within Syria’s borders. Despite this, numerous attempts have been made
by the international community to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC.
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has recommended that
the Security Council refer the situation in Syria to the ICC on many occa-
sions.60 Several Security Council resolutions have been drafted, which
even included explicit language—calling out the crimes in Syria as “war
crimes” and “crimes against humanity”—which would give the ICC juris-
diction.61 Additionally, in January of 2013, almost sixty states called upon
the Security Council to refer the situation in Syria to the ICC in an open
letter. Despite all these referral attempts, none of them have succeeded
due to the politicized nature of the Security Council.62 Russia and China—
close allies of the Syrian regime—have continuously blocked all Security
Council resolutions that attempt to promote accountability efforts in
Syria.63
Besides the issue with triggering the ICC’s jurisdiction, the ICC’s
heavy dependence on the cooperation of the Syrian government is another
significant obstacle for prosecution.64 The ICC would need the coopera-
tion of state officials in “gaining access to evidence, transferring perpetra-
tors to the Court, protecting witnesses, and so on.”65 Despite the many
obstacles standing in the way of the ICC gaining jurisdiction over the Syr-
ian conflict, the substance of the crimes being committed in Syria are ex-
actly those that the ICC was created to prosecute.
The last potential avenue for accountability in Syria is through the
establishment of an ad hoc international criminal tribunal, similar to those
created for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The likelihood of this op-
tion succeeding is also low because, again, it would be dependent on the
will of the Security Council. Furthermore, it is, arguably, more efficient to
refer the situation to the ICC as the ICC’s entire purpose is to prosecute
the types of crimes that the Assad regime, and others, are currently com-
59. Id. at arts. 12–14.
60. Syria and the International Criminal Court: Questions and Answers, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (2013), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Q%26A_Syr
ia_ICC_Sept2013_en_0.pdf.
61. UNSC Res 2165 and 2258
62. The permanent five member states of the UN Security Council (or the P-5) include
the United States, Russia, China, France, and the United Kingdom. These are the only states
that possess the veto power with regards to resolutions, allowing them to have determinative
influence over which resolutions get passed.
63. See Michelle Nichols, Russia blocks U.N. Security Council condemnation of Syria
attack, REUTERS, (Apr, 12, 2017) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-un-
vote/russia-blocks-u-n-security-council-condemnation-of-syria-attack-idUSKBN17E2LK;
Russia and China veto UN resolution to impose sanctions on Syria, THE GUARDIAN (MAR. 1,
2017) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/01/russia-and-china-veto-un-resolution-
to-impose-sanctions-on-syria
64. Jones, supra note 56, at 808.
65. Id.
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mitting in Syria.66 Since the ICC already has the institutional capacity to
prosecute the crimes being committed by the Assad government, it is more
cost-effective to use that avenue rather than setting up a separate indepen-
dent tribunal.
Although there are a variety of obstacles with all three avenues for
pursuing justice in Syria, the ICC would be the most appropriate forum for
prosecuting the Assad regime for the widespread crimes committed in the
context of the conflict. The ICC has the capacity to investigate and prose-
cute international crimes of such complexity. It is also less susceptible to
bias than domestic courts, and would be less likely to spark further conflict
in the region.
INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY
If the ICC were to somehow acquire jurisdiction over the Syrian con-
flict and oversee the investigation and prosecution of the crimes at issue,
Assad and high-ranking officials within his government could be found
individually liable under Rome Statute Article 25, which details the vari-
ous modes of individual criminal responsibility, and Article 28, which spe-
cifically delves into the responsibility of commanders and other
superiors.67
The incriminating evidence that exists is likely sufficient to attribute
individual criminal liability to Assad and high-ranking officials within the
regime under these provisions of the Rome Statute. In addition to witness
testimony and UN and media reports, the increased use of digital media,
including social media, will be tremendously valuable to international war
crime prosecutors as it will provide much more evidence at their disposal.
For example, anti-government protesters and activists have been docu-
menting evidence via social media outlets since the start of conflict in
March 2011. Additionally, CIJA’s evidence gathering efforts will also
strengthen the prosecution’s case immensely. Not only is Assad as culpa-
ble as other war crime perpetrators prosecuted before him at the ICC, he
may be even more culpable. The evidence that exists against him is more
extensive than that used to prosecute other war crime perpetrators before
him. Because the case against Assad is stronger than that of previous cases
the ICC has tried, these previous cases can be used as blueprints in prose-
cuting Assad at the ICC. The cases that are helpful in developing theories
of individual criminal liability against Assad include The Prosecutor v.
Germain Katanga, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, and The
Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.
Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute lists six forms of individual criminal
responsibility. It is different from prior legal frameworks in the sense that
it systemizes modes of participation into levels. The first level encom-
passes both direct and indirect commission, the highest degree of individ-
ual responsibility. The second level attributes individual liability to those
66. Id. at 811.
67. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, arts. 25 and 28.
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who order or instigate crimes within the jurisdiction. The third level is de-
signed for aiders and abettors, and the fourth covers any other contribu-
tion to a group crime.68 The fifth level encompasses those who directly
and publicly incite others to commit the crime of genocide in particular.
Lastly, the sixth level covers individuals who take a substantial step to-
wards the commission of a crime, but the crime does not occur due to
circumstances independent of the individual’s intentions.69 Although all of
these modes of liability could potentially be applied to the Assad regime’s
conduct, this paper will only apply articles (a) and (d), the first and fourth
levels respectively, to the actions of the Assad regime. This paper also
argues that Assad could also be found individually liable as a superior
under article 28 of the Rome Statute.
ARTICLE 25(3)(A): INDIRECT COMMISSION
Article 25(3)(a) attributes individual criminal responsibility to a per-
son who “commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with an-
other or through another person, regardless of whether that other person
is criminally responsible.”70 The third manner of commission listed within
this subsection, “through another person,” has been actively developed by
the ICC through previous cases. This form of liability is applicable to indi-
rect perpetrators and proving it requires proof of objective and subjective
elements. These elements were clarified by the Trial Chamber II through
its decision in The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga71 Although the accused
in that case was not found individually responsible as an indirect perpetra-
tor, the Chamber’s application of article 25(3)(a) in the decision sheds
light on how this provision could be used as a theory of Assad’s individual
criminal liability.
On March 7, 2014, the ICC convicted Germain Katanga for crimes he
committed while attacking the village of Bogoro in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC). He was found liable for murder as a crime
against humanity, as well as for the war crimes of murder, attacking a civil-
ian population, destruction of property, and pillaging.72 The Chamber first
evaluated his individual liability as an indirect perpetrator under article
25(3)(a), explaining that it incurs where a person “1) exerts control over
the crime where the material elements were brought about by one or more
68. Gerhard Werle, Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article 25 ICC Statute, 5 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 953, 957 (2007).
69. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 25.
70. Id.
71. The ICC has three judicial divisions: the Pre-Trial Division (composed of seven
judges), the Trial Division (composed of six judges), and the Appeals Division (composed of
five judges). They are assigned to the following Chambers: the Pre-Trial Chambers (each
composed of one or three judges), the Trial Chambers (each composed of three judges) and
the Appeals Chamber (composed of the five judges of the Appeals Division).
72. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, Trial Chamber II’s Judgment pursu-
ant to article 74 of the Statute, (Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_
04025.pdf.
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persons, 2) meets the mental elements prescribed by article 30 of the
Rome Statute and the mental elements specific to the crime at issue, and
3) is aware of the factual circumstances which allow the person to exert
control over the crime.”73 With regards to the first element, control may
take various forms such as control over the will of the perpetrators, includ-
ing those who act under duress or by mistake.74 Exerting control over the
crime can also include “the existence of an organized apparatus of power
whose leadership may be assured that its members will carry out the mate-
rial elements of the crime.”75 The Pre-Trial Chamber held that where a
crime is committed by members of an “organized and hierarchical appara-
tus of power, the highest authority does not merely order the commission
of a crime, but through his control over the organization, essentially de-
cides whether and how the crime would be committed.”76 In such an appa-
ratus of power, the superior’s orders are automatically executed since the
inferiors within the apparatus are interchangeable—they will always be
someone available to carry out the orders no matter what. Proving this
requires that the person wielding control over the apparatus of power con-
ceived of the crime, oversaw its preparation at different hierarchical levels,
and controlled its performance and execution.77 This is how the superior
ensures control over the crime.
Although the Chamber found that Katanga was at the apex of the
militia, it did not find that there was a centralized and effective chain of
command. For that reason, the Chamber could not conclude that the mili-
tia was an organized apparatus of power and that Katanga exerted control
over the crimes of that militia under article 25(3)(a) of the Statute. Unlike
the circumstances in Katanga, Assad’s military apparatus is organized and
integrated in a way that implicates the highest levels of the government’s
armed security forces.78 At the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011, “the
Syrian Army was one of the largest and best-trained forces in the Arab
world.”79  It consisted of eight armored or mechanized divisions and five
specialized divisions.80 However, not all divisions have been deployed dur-
ing the conflict; in fact, Assad has made a conscious effort to deploy only
those factions that are most loyal to him in order to avoid as many defec-
tions as possible.81 In addition to controlling the military apparatus, Assad
also maintains full control over his security-intelligence agencies. Al-
though the security-intelligence agencies develop many of the policies,
73. Id. ¶ 1399.
74. Id. ¶ 1402.
75. Id. ¶ 1403.
76. Id. ¶ 1405.
77. Id. ¶ 1412.
78. See Taub, supra note 33.
79. Joseph Holliday, The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency to Civil War, INST.
FOR THE STUDY OF WAR (2013), http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/TheAs-
sadRegime-web.pdf.
80. Id. at 42.
81. Id. at 43.
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none of them are implemented without Assad’s signature. Once Assad ap-
proves an order or a policy, the security-intelligence agency leaders send
instructions down to the regional branch leaders who then pass the orders
to local security agents for implementation.82 All of this evidence is mate-
rial that an ICC prosecutor could use to prove that Assad was in full con-
trol of the crimes being committed by his forces.
The second criterion for the indirect commission of a crime—that the
mental element of indirect commission must meet the elements of article
30 of the statute,83 as well as the mental elements specific to the crime at
issue—can also be proven through existing evidence. The prosecutor must
prove that the material elements of the crimes were committed with
knowledge and intent. Assad’s knowledge of any of the crimes detailed
previously can be proven through the documentary evidence that CIJA
investigators have smuggled out of the country. These documents prove
Assad’s knowledge; Assad personally signed policies that involve arbitrary
arrests and sexual violence in detention centers, among other crimes. Fur-
thermore, human rights organizations have documented many of the
crimes that have occurred within government-controlled detention facili-
ties, prisons and hospitals. That circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
prove that Assad was aware of the abuses that occurred within organiza-
tions under the control of his own security forces.
With regard to the third criterion, Assad must be aware of the factual
circumstances which allow him to exert control over the crime. In the
Chamber’s words, this means Assad must know of the “ingredients funda-
mental to his exertion of control over the crimes.”84 Although many
soldiers have defected from Assad’s army since the start of the conflict,
the soldiers that remain are extremely loyal to Assad. Assad is aware of
that fact, and there is documentary evidence to prove it. If Assad signs off
on a policy allowing his soldiers to use rape as a war weapon, he is close to
certain that his soldiers will carry through with the order. In other words,
he is aware of the factual circumstances that allow him to exert control
over his soldiers’ actions.
82. Supra note 5.
83. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 30.
“1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable
for punishment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the
material elements are committed with intent and knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that conse-
quence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes of this article, “knowledge” means awareness that a circum-
stance exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.
“Know” and “knowingly” shall be construed accordingly.”
84. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, ¶1415.
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ARTICLE 25(3)(A): JOINT COMMISSION
Katanga demonstrates how the ICC has developed liability through
another person under 25(3)(a).85 The ICC’s decision in The Prosecutor v.
Thomas Lubanga Diol clarifies the law on committing a crime jointly with
another person also under 25(3)(a) of the Statute.86 The ICC’s develop-
ment of the law on this mode of liability, in particular, also supports a
future conviction for Assad. On March 14, 2012, the ICC found Lubanga
guilty of war crimes of enlisting and conscripting child soldiers during the
Ituri Conflict that occurred in the DRC between 1999 and 2007. Finding
him individually liable for these crimes as a co-perpetrator, the ICC ap-
plied the “control over the crime” doctrine. The Chamber focused its deci-
sion on the co-perpetrator’s level of contribution to the commission of the
crime, which recognizes as principals those who decide the method of exe-
cution of the crime and not just those who actually perpetrate it.87 The
Pre-Trial Chamber specified that co-perpetration consists of two objective
elements, the first being the existence of a common plan between two or
more persons, and the second being the essential contribution by each co-
perpetrator to the objective elements of the crime.88 A contribution is
considered “essential” if the common purpose cannot be realized without
it.89An essential contribution could consist of planning or organizing the
commission of the crime and does not necessarily have to be the physical
perpetration of it; planning or organizing has an element of control.
Additionally, the Pre-Trial Chamber clarified the subjective elements
required for co-perpetration by applying article 30 of the Rome Statute—
that a co-perpetrator must act with intent and knowledge. This can be es-
tablished if “1) the person is aware that a circumstance exists or a conse-
quence will occur in the ordinary course of events and 2) the person
intends to engage in the relevant conduct and cause the relevant conse-
quences or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”90
Lubanga was President of the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC),
and established its military wing, the Patriotic Force for the Liberation of
the Congo (FPLC). He was also commander in chief of the army.91 Al-
though he was not directly involved with recruiting and training child
soldiers—since that fell to the responsibility of military authorities—
Lubanga was still well-informed on military matters and endorsed recruit-
ment initiatives. There was evidence that he gave orders on military af-
fairs.92 The Chamber concluded that he shaped the policies of the UPC/
85. See Id.
86. See Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-1/06, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the
Statute, ¶ 921 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2006_02329.pdf.
87. Id. ¶ 920.
88. Id. ¶ 923.
89. Werle, supra note 68, at 962.
90. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-1/06, ¶ 926.
91. Id. ¶ 1142.
92. Id. ¶ 1266.
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FPLC and directed the activities of his co-perpetrators.93 His role was es-
sential to the implementation of a common plan. The Chamber also con-
cluded that Lubanga fulfilled the mental element of the crime by intending
to participate in implementing the common plan, and that he was aware
that the conscription and enlistment of children less than 15 years of age
will occur “in the ordinary course of events as a result of the implementa-
tion of the common plan.”94
Although the substance of Assad’s crimes varies from those of
Lubanga, both leaders played very similar roles in the perpetration of the
crimes that occurred in their respective countries. Assad had a common
plan with the officials in his security-intelligence and military apparatuses.
That plan was to carry out torture tactics in detention facilities, use rape as
a war weapon, and commit other atrocities in order to crush the rebellion
against him. Assad’s contribution was absolutely essential to the imple-
mentation of the common plan because he approved every action commit-
ted by his forces. Nothing occurred without his direction or consent. Other
top leaders in his regime were also essential because they gave direct or-
ders to people on the ground.
Assad and Lubanga were both commanders in chief during a period of
civil war, as well as top commanders of hierarchical armies. Their leader-
ship in planning military operations made both of their roles essential to
the implementation of the common plan to defeat their opposition. They
also both shaped the policies and strategies of the military, essentially act-
ing as the masterminds behind their military’s activities. Lubanga commu-
nicated frequently with his co-perpetrators95 in the same way that Assad
maintained constant communication with the Crisis Cell. Therefore,
Lubanga’s conviction under article 25(3)(a) can be used as a blueprint in
prosecuting Assad.
ARTICLE 25(3)(D): CONTRIBUTION TO A GROUP CRIME
Article 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute offers two routes of prosecuting
the officials at the highest levels of the Assad regime, including Assad
himself. Alternatively, Article 25(3)(d) could be applied to Assad’s con-
duct throughout the conflict. Katanga clarifies the law in this area, since
Katanga was convicted of murder as a crime against humanity under Arti-
cle 7(1)(a) and murder as a war crime under article 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome
Statute and found individually liable under article 25(3)(d). This article
deals with contributions in “any other way.” It is a residual form of acces-
soryship, used for conduct that is not considered aiding and abetting under
25(3)(c).96 Although Assad is certainly a principal to the crimes commit-
ted in Syria, subsection (d) could be used as an alternative theory to prose-
cute him.
93. Id. ¶ 1270.
94. Id. ¶ 1274 (internal quotation marks omitted).
95. Id. ¶ 1216.
96. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-3436, ¶ 1618.
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Katanga was found guilty of murder as a crime against humanity when
the Chamber applied the following objective elements: “1) the accused
committed or attempted to commit a crime within ICC jurisdiction, 2) the
commission of such crime was by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose, and 3) the accused made a significant contribution to the
crime.”97 The Chamber specified that it is necessary for the crime to be a
part of the common purpose.98 Furthermore, the accused’s contribution
must be “connected to the commission of the crime and not solely to the
activities of the group in a general sense.”99 For the contribution to be
significant, it must influence the commission of the crime, but it does not
have to directly influence it.100 In other words, the accused does not have
to be a physical perpetrator to be considered an accessory to the crime.
The subjective elements that the Chamber took into account include that
the contribution by the accused was intentional, and that one of the spe-
cific mental elements specified in paragraphs (i) and (ii).101 Either the ac-
cused’s contribution must be “made with the aim of furthering the
criminal activity or criminal purpose of the group” or “be made with
knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.”102 The
Chamber relied on the second alternative in finding Katanga guilty.
The Chamber found that all of these elements existed in Katanga. It
found first of all that the Ngiti combatants committed murder as crimes
against humanity and war crimes, both crimes within the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion. It also found that the Ngiti combatants were a part of a militia, which
is a group of persons, and they were acting with a common purpose when
they attacked the village of Bogoro and killed the Hema population. It
also established that Germain Katanga made a significant contribution to
the commission of the crimes as the president of the Ngiti militia by con-
tributing to the planning of the attack on Bogoro among other acts. It
further found that Katanga intended his contribution since he testified to
the fact that he “acted deliberately and was fully aware that his conduct
contributed to the activities of the Ngiti militia.”103 The Chamber also
found that he knew of the intention of the group to commit the crimes
which formed their common purpose. The evidence showed that he knew
the weapons and ammunition was intended for the attack because he facil-
itated its delivery and distribution.104
Although the Chamber did not find that Katanga was an accessory to
rape and sexual slavery as war crimes and crimes against humanity under
article 25(3)(d), it is likely that there is enough evidence for Assad to be
97. Id. ¶ 1620.
98. Id. ¶ 1630.
99. Id. ¶ 1632.
100. Id.
101. Id. ¶ 1638.
102. Id. ¶ 1640 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Id. ¶ 1683.
104. Id. ¶ 1684.
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prosecuted for such crimes at the ICC. Because it is almost certain that
Assad could be prosecuted as a principal under article 25(3)(a), proving
that Assad was an accessory to crimes is simpler since it requires a lower
showing of responsibility by the accused. Focusing on his crimes of rape
and sexual assault for example, the prosecutor would first have to show
that the rape was committed as a war crime or crime against humanity. As
was previously discussed, reports of rape by regime soldiers have been
heavily documented. Second, the prosecutor would have to show that As-
sad committed that crime as a part of a group with a common purpose. He
would not have to show that Assad physically perpetrated any instances of
rape or sexual violence. He would only have to show that part of the As-
sad regime’s common purpose was to use rape as a war tool, targeting
women known to be associated with the opposition. The prosecutor would
next have to prove that Assad made a significant contribution to the com-
mission of the crime. Assad’s contribution is not only significant, but it is
essential to all the crimes that were committed. Without Assad, no official
within his regime would have the authority to do anything. Additionally,
Assad had the requisite mens rea as everything that he ordered was done
with the goal of quashing the rebellion and destroying certain groups of
people in Syria. In conclusion, article 25(3)(d) would be the easiest way of
prosecuting Assad because it requires the lowest burden for the
prosecutor.
ARTICLE 28: SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY
Article 28 of the Rome Statute assigns individual criminal responsibil-
ity to commanders and superiors specifically. The article attributes individ-
ual criminal responsibility to a military commander or person effectively
acting as a military commander “for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Court committed by forces under his or her effective command and con-
trol, or effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his
or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces.”105 That mili-
tary commander or person “either knew. . .or should have known that the
forces were committing or about to commit such crimes [and] failed to
take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or her power to
prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the compe-
tent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”106 The article also as-
signs individual liability to superiors not considered military commanders.
The ICC first addressed liability of an accused under superior respon-
sibility in the case of The Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo.107 The
ICC convicted Bemba, under article 28(a) of the Statute, as a person effec-
105. The Rome Statute, supra note 5, art. 28.
106. Id.
107. Alexandre Skander Galand, First Ruling on Command Responsibility before the
ICC, CASE MATRIX NETWORK (2016) http://blog.casematrixnetwork.org/toolkits/eventsnews/
news/first-ruling-on-command-responsibility-before-the-icc/?doing_wp_cron=1520552961.847
8660583496093750000
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tively acting as a military commander of the crimes of murder and rape as
both war crimes and crimes against humanity.108 Unlike Lubanga and
Katanga, Bemba was actually convicted for crimes of using sexual violence
against men, women, and children as a tool to terrorize the civilian popula-
tion in the Central African Republic (CAR). In Bemba, the Chamber
found that Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) forces com-
mitted crimes within the jurisdiction of the court beyond a reasonable
doubt. Bemba was Commander in Chief of the Liberation Army of the
Congo (ALC) and President of the MLC throughout the period of the
relevant charges. They found that he had “ultimate decision-making au-
thority” and “broad formal powers”.109 Bemba additionally directed the
MLC’s funding, communicated directly with commanders in the field, had
well-established reporting methods set up, received operational and tech-
nical advice from the MLC General Staff, and issued operational or-
ders.110 He also had disciplinary authority over MLC troops.
The Chamber further found that Bemba knew that MLC forces were
committing these crimes. Although he was not physically at the location of
the atrocities, he was the leader of his forces and had ultimate authority
over all military operations. Bemba was constantly informed via military
and civilian intelligence services with “information on the combat situa-
tion, troop positions, politics, and allegations of crimes.”111 Additionally,
the Chamber found that Bemba “failed to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent or repress the commission of the crimes, or to submit
the matter to competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.”112
Instead, Bemba merely warned his troops not to mistreat civilians, created
two investigative commissions, and had seven low-ranking soldiers tried
on trivial pillaging charges. He also set up the Sibut Mission, which was
supposed to be an investigation of the alleged crimes, but it did not fulfill
that purpose.113 Bemba could have withdrawn troops from CAR at any
time, but did not do so until March 2003. Lastly, the Chamber found that
the crimes were committed as a result of Bemba’s failure to “exercise con-
trol properly” over the MLC forces, including remedying deficiencies in
training and taking necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
commission of crimes, and submit the matter to competent authorities.114
As president and commander in chief, Assad could similarly be found
individually liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity under arti-
cle 28 of the Rome Statute. Although the Assad regime has its own mili-
tary apparatus and a hierarchy of power within it, Assad represents the
108. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article 61
(7) (a) and (b) (Confirmation of Charges), ¶ 697, (Jun. 15, 2009).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. ¶ 708.
112. Id. ¶ 718
113. Id. ¶ 726.
114. Id. ¶ 737.
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ultimate authority over the military. His military is under his complete
command and control. In July of 2012, a bomb attack killed Assad’s inner
circle security leadership, including his brother-in-law and defense minis-
ter.115 At that point, Assad assumed personal command over his military,
assuming day-to-day decision-making authority.116 There is no possible
way that Assad was unaware of crimes committed by his forces, since eve-
rything they did was integrated into a statewide policy that Assad ulti-
mately approved. Furthermore, Assad failed to take any measures to
prevent the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity;
rather, he did the opposite in encouraging and approving of them. Once
again, the proof exists within the documents that CIJA stole, known as the
Assad Files. Looking at the cases that have been mentioned throughout
this paper, one lesson remains clear—the degree of criminal responsibility
does not decrease as distance from the actual act increases; in fact, it is
often the exact opposite.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, finding Assad and top officials within his regime indi-
vidually criminally liable for war crimes and crimes against humanity is
possible through prosecution at the ICC. Articles 25 and 28 provide sev-
eral modes of liability that are potential pathways for their prosecution.
The evidence exists. The blueprints exist. The only thing left is for jurisdic-
tion to take hold, and that cannot happen without support from the entire
international community. If politics continues to trump humanity, the Syr-
ian people will never attain the justice they deserve.
115. Samia Nakhoul, In shifting Syria Conflict, Assad assumes command of forces,
REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-assad-asma-idUSBRE
8990U220121010.
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